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JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND TAKING CONFLICTING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

REBECCA L. BROWN*
ABSTRACT
The best arguments in favor of judicial supremacy rely on its
essential role of protecting rights in a democracy. The doctrinal
technique of strict scrutiny, developed to do the work of judicial
supremacy, has been an important tool in our constitutional jurisprudence in the service of rights protection. When the Supreme Court
reviews laws that themselves seek to enhance or preserve constitutional rights, however, strict scrutiny does not provide the right
approach. Rather, the Court should consider very carefully the rights
claims in favor of the statute as well as those launched by a challenger. In such cases of conflicting rights, the Court has not taken
seriously enough the obligation that justifies judicial supremacy,
taking rights seriously.

* The Rader Family Trustee Chair in Law, USC Gould School of Law. This Article was
prepared as a contribution to the symposium, Judicial Supremacy v. Departmentalism, at
William & Mary Law School. The title evokes, with lasting appreciation, RONALD DWORKIN ,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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INTRODUCTION
Judicial supremacy is more an attitude than a principle. At the
end of the day, there is little space between the natural consequences of judicial review and a system of judicial supremacy,
defined as “the obligation of coordinate officials not only to obey [a
judicial] ruling but to follow its reasoning in future deliberations.”1
Although judicial supremacy posits deference by other government
actors to judicial interpretations even when they think that courts
are wrong,2 the actual impact of any such disagreement is quite
small. If the other branch is a party to a case, then the court’s
interpretation of the Constitution will necessarily prevail over that
of any other branch of government.3 For areas of constitutional
meaning that are not potential cases, then even rhetorical hyperbole
on behalf of courts’ primacy would be tempered by the incapacity of
federal courts to give advisory opinions,4 so that most disagreements
over meaning on matters not subject to judicial review would be
largely hypothetical.
It is often said that the Court indulged in the great hubris of
judicial supremacy in Cooper v. Aaron, but it is important to distinguish what the Court said in Cooper from what it did.5 In Cooper,
often touted as the high watermark of judicial supremacy,6 the
Court made some bold statements suggesting that the Constitution
means only what the Court says it means.7 But consider what the
1. Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional
Interpreter, 48 REV. POLITICS 401, 407 (1986).
2. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON , POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 7
(2007).
3. See id.
4. See Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172 (1977) (per curiam) (“For a declaratory
judgment to issue, there must be a dispute which ‘calls, not for an advisory opinion upon a
hypothetical basis, but for an adjudication of present right upon established facts.’” (quoting
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 242 (1937))).
5. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). In Cooper, an Arkansas school board, as a party to the case, argued
that the governor and legislature of the state, which had obstructed the board’s compliance
with a court order, were not bound by the Court’s holding in Brown v. Board of Education. Id.
at 15-17.
6. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 45 (7th ed. 2013) (reading Cooper
to suggest a special and privileged role for courts in interpreting constitutional meaning).
7. See, e.g., Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition
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Court did. A party to the case was seeking relief from a federal
court’s order to desegregate on the ground that the State of Arkansas had interfered with its ability to comply;8 it is hard to see
any choice for the Court other than to rule against the legitimacy of
the State’s effort to undermine a court order issued to vindicate an
individual right of injured plaintiffs. The Governor of Arkansas was
not rebuked for merely articulating disagreement with a court in the
abstract, but for claiming the power to disrupt fulfillment of a
court’s decree.9 The Court did indulge in some far-reaching language, displaying an attitude which has been the subject of a great
deal of criticism.10 But keeping in mind that such language, coupled
with the unique symbolic act of all nine Justices claiming authorship of the opinion,11 was all the Court had to respond to an assault
of words and violence on its authority to decide cases within its own
sphere, the decision itself is surprisingly unremarkable. As Cooper
demonstrates, attitude has played a significant role in the story of
judicial supremacy.
The question then is why there has been so much debate about a
concept of judicial supremacy that, in its most formalistic sense, has
little impact on courts’ legitimacy in deciding cases before them and
applying their view of the law as precedent. There are other facets
of the phenomenon of judicial supremacy that regard its rhetorical
and political force within the government,12 but with regard to the
legal impact of judicial supremacy, I claim that the major complaints are not actually about courts having the final word at all.
Although there are a few who would go so far as to take the
Constitution away from the courts,13 many concerns about judicial
supremacy are more readily understood as concerns about whether
of the law of the Constitution.”).
8. See id. at 15.
9. See id. at 18-19.
10. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 986-87
(1987) (“[T]he implication of the dictum that everyone should accept constitutional decisions
uncritically, that they are judgments from which there is no appeal, was astonishing.”).
11. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4.
12. For an outstanding and rich examination of the matter from a largely political and
historical perspective, see WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, which traces the struggles for interpretive authority over time.
13. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 163-65 (1999)
(developing a case for popular constitutional law without judicial review).
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the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution correctly in
specific cases.
Part of the legal doctrine that contributes to judicial supremacy
is the body of law in which the Court decides how much deference
to give to other potential decision makers. I take some of the most
strident attacks on judicial supremacy to be criticizing that body of
law, suggesting that the Court should read the Constitution in ways
that show more respect for the work of the other branches of
government when there is a choice to be made in how to exercise its
final interpretative authority.14 That is why I consider judicial
supremacy to be more a question of attitude than of principle. The
mistake that the Court is accused of making is not necessarily a
matter of legal obligation, but more of prudence—in failing to
recognize appropriately the judiciary’s place as one of three branches, as a part of a federal system, and as a fiduciary of public trust in
interpreting a document that has strong populist roots and significant consequences for the people. By resolving constitutional
disputes without due recognition to its own institutional limitations,
the Court succumbs to the sin of supremacy. A sense of institutional
role underlies, explicitly or implicitly, much of constitutional doctrine, but there is a legitimate concern that the Court has lost a
sense of how doctrine should take account of different voices in the
Republic.15
For example, Larry Kramer launched a broad-based historical
attack on judicial supremacy that called the entire edifice of judicial
review as we know it into question on the basis that it undervalues
the role of popular constitutionalism in the implementation of our
fundamental commitments.16 But even in mounting so profound an
external challenge to our judicial system, Kramer also devotes
considerable effort to making an internal attack on specific cases in
which the Rehnquist Court read the Constitution wrong in ways
14. Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-28 (Yale University
Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962) (suggesting the use of jurisdictional passive virtues to mitigate the
“deviant” nature of judicial review).
15. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 251-53 (2004) (not seeking to eliminate judicial review, but arguing it has
been seriously misunderstood and could exist without judicial supremacy); TUSHNET, supra
note 13, at 163-65 (arguing to eliminate judicial review altogether).
16. KRAMER, supra note 15, at 207-09.
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that “squeeze[d] ‘the people’ out of the Constitution.”17 A prime
target of Kramer’s attack was the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore,
for undertaking judicial review of a matter that should have been
left to Congress.18 Kramer complained that “any notion that what
the Constitution does or permits might best be left for the people to
resolve using the ordinary devices available to express their will
seems beyond the Rehnquist Court’s compass.... This is judicial
sovereignty.”19
Framed this way, the problem of judicial supremacy is doctrinal,
not structural. It can be solved by persuading courts to change their
attitude. The problem, indeed, can be solved without sacrificing
judicial supremacy or even compromising it, because a doctrinal
solution does not challenge the Court’s power to do the job of judicial
review; rather, it tells the Court how to do that job. To the extent
there are valid arguments raised in opposition to judicial supremacy,20 some of them can be addressed within the system of robust
judicial review itself. The frame of judicial overreaching that has
animated the debates about judicial supremacy can, indeed, provide
new appreciation to the values for which judicial review exists in the
first place: the protection of a broad array of constitutional values
and, more specifically, the protection of individual rights.
One particular place where judicial analysis could benefit from
this kind of attitude shift toward humility is in cases where the
Court considers a constitutional rights claim leveled against a
statute that itself seeks to create or expand rights. I will explore in
this Article how the rationales underlying judicial supremacy, as
well as some of the attacks on it, should affect the contours of judicial decisions about the Constitution’s meaning in the case of a
conflict of rights. The best rationale for judicial supremacy is that
it protects rights; when the Court uses its power of review to strike
down rights-protecting legislation in the name of a conflicting individual right, therefore, it should give due regard to the possibility
that rights claims can reasonably be made on both sides of the
17. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 5, 130 (2001).
18. See 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (reversing the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment ordering
manual recounts of votes in the 2000 presidential election).
19. Kramer, supra note 17, at 158.
20. See, e.g., id. at 130.
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dispute. Thus, the use of strict judicial scrutiny—developed to
advantage rights claims when threatened by a law without rightsaffirming goals—is inappropriate in this situation. The use of strict
scrutiny under these circumstances gives inadequate deference to
the legislative effort to further constitutional values and to the
popular understanding of rights that such legislation represents. It
thus exacerbates the deficiencies of judicial supremacy and compromises the principal justification supporting the Court’s power to
decide the case in the first place.
This Article will draw on the very powerful arguments leveled by
Jeremy Waldron against judicial review as a way to consider how
review of conflicting rights can be improved to further the underlying benefits and advantages of judicial review. Instead of reflexively
employing strict scrutiny to assess all rights claims, the Court
should develop an approach that gives more consideration to state
interests that may be furthered by a rights-protecting law. By taking seriously the reasonable disagreements that legislatures acting
in good faith may have about what the constitutional values of
liberty and equality require, the Supreme Court will further the
goals of judicial supremacy and mitigate its costs.
I. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND ITS PRINCIPAL
WEAKNESS
The strongest argument for judicial supremacy is that it is a good
way to preserve or promote rights and protect the politically powerless.21 Judicial review promises “[a] good decision and a process in
which claims of rights are steadily and seriously considered.”22
Perhaps this advantage in the task of considering claims of rights
comes as a result of the Court’s structural characteristics, such as
electoral independence and an obligation to provide reasons, as

21. Other rationales have been propounded. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1371 (1997)
(arguing that judicial supremacy is needed to provide stability, consistency, and settlement
by avoiding multiplicity of interpretations of fundamental law).
22. Jeremy Waldron, Essay, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1348 (2006) (adapting a phrase from RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 9-32
(1985)).
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some have argued.23 Perhaps it comes in the provision of a second
layer of scrutiny for laws, first by legislatures and then by the
courts, to assess conformity with rights guarantees, as others have
suggested.24 Perhaps it is a natural outgrowth of a commitment to
limited or constrained government action, which has a clear implication for the enforcement of individual rights.25 Erwin Chemerinsky
in this volume nicely lays out the arguments for why the judiciary
appropriately functions as the “moral conscience” best suited to hold
the nation to its highest values by interpreting the Constitution.26
I hope I do not do injustice to defenders of judicial review and
judicial supremacy collectively by simplifying here what I believe to
be the principal rationale behind those concepts: the judiciary’s
ability to take rights seriously.
This underlying rationale supports the idea that the courts should
have the task of interpreting the Constitution but says little
expressly to guide the courts in doing that task. As I argued above,
many of the attacks on judicial supremacy have sounded more in
how the Court has resolved particular legal questions under the
Constitution than in its right to do so.27 But the two are importantly
linked.
The best attack on judicial review comes from Jeremy Waldron.
I say this because Waldron meets the strongest argument for
judicial review—the protection of rights—head-on and on its own
terms. He argues that judicial review disserves the very goal to
which defenders of judicial review insist it is essential: the protection of rights.28 Although many challengers of judicial review have,
in some cases justly, been accused of valuing rights too little,29
23. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 71 (2001)
(discussing life tenure, reasoning, and political appointment as allowing for judges to render
impartial decisions on moral questions of justice).
24. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1576 (2000) (arguing that liberty is enhanced by adding an additional
check on government action); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial
Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1695 (2008) (agreeing with Cross’s point and elaborating).
25. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1513-15 (1991) (discussing links between structural constraint and rights).
26. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Supremacy, 58 WM . & MARY L. REV.
1459, 1470 (2017).
27. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
28. Waldron, supra note 22, at 1406.
29. See BICKEL, supra note 14, at 18 (concluding that “judicial review is a deviant
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Waldron completely disavows rights skepticism; yet from the
opposite vantage point, he still finds judicial review to be wanting
in a democracy.30 Why? His answer is that the strongest version of
rights protection under the Constitution is understood as a scheme
of moral rights imbedded into capacious text, structure, and history,
and that people of good faith can and will necessarily disagree about
what those rights are and what they entail.31 The disagreement over
what constitutes a right, he argues, may not be resolved by unelected judges without compromising principles of political equality
among citizens.32 For example, two people who disagree about
whether a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy may be restricted can both accept the centrality of a right to life and a right
to personal autonomy but have different “conceptions” of those
rights33—both sincerely held and both held alongside a commitment
to rights protection in general.34 Waldron argues that relegating
resolution of these differences to courts insults and disenfranchises
the polity in violation of the basic terms of legitimate democracy.35
Although I do not accept Waldron’s ultimate conclusion that
judicial review is illegitimate, I do want to take seriously what I
take from Waldron’s provocative argument, which I see as an important insight that has been severely underappreciated in discussions
about the legitimacy vel non of judicial review: the possibility of
reasonable disagreement among people of good faith about what
rights entail. In light of that insight, if we are to maintain a system
of judicial review, what could or should courts do to mitigate the
compromise of moral agency of the people, which Waldron identifies
as the cost of such review?
institution in the American democracy”). Robert Bork was a particularly strident rights
skeptic. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND .
L.J. 1, 10 (1971) (discussing the move toward constitutionalizing “gratifications” as rights).
30. See Waldron, supra note 22, at 1366.
31. Id. at 1406.
32. Id. at 1353.
33. Just as Waldron, see id. at 1367, this discussion uses “conception” as Ronald Dworkin
did, meaning the way that an abstract concept of a right applies to a given situation. See
RONALD DWORKIN , TAKING RIGHT SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977) (discussing differences between
a concept and differing conceptions of it).
34. See Waldron, supra note 22, at 1367 (offering an analogous example using the right
to free speech).
35. Id. at 1353.
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Waldron sets out the core case against judicial review based on
certain important assumptions about the society at issue.36 Significantly, two of Waldron’s four assumptions are a working, democratically elected legislature and a society committed to protecting
individual rights.37 His case against judicial review depends on the
existence of these characteristics in a society.38 Accepting these
conditions, my working hypothesis for purposes of this Article is
that legislatures have passed and do pass laws in order to benefit
the common good, sometimes to grant or expand rights, and that,
while they may have dysfunctions, they are not infected with the
particular brand of dysfunction identified by John Hart Ely in midcentury America in which legislation was passed intentionally to
oppress those without legislative power.39 That latter situation does
not plausibly raise questions of conflicting rights (other than the
“right” of majorities to enact their preferences into law despite their
consequences to others, which is no right at all).40 Rather, such
36. Id. at 1360 (listing four assumptions about society that underlie his theory).
37. Id.
38. Id. Underlying Waldron’s antijudicial review theory are two additional assumptions:
(1) a set of judicial institutions set up to uphold the rule of law; and (2) substantial good-faith
disagreement about rights among the members of the society. Id.
39. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-36 (1980) (positing a representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review to justify invalidation of laws passed under
conditions that constitute a democratic malfunction).
40. Apologies for the dismissive treatment of what has actually been a serious point of
debate among some philosophers—the extent to which the right of popular sovereignty is
compromised every time a court strikes down legislation on any ground, which would render
any act of judicial review a conflict of rights. See RONALD DWORKIN , FREEDOM ’S LAW : THE
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 21-22 (1996) (refuting the argument that
constitutionalism undermines the liberty of citizens to govern themselves); Evelyne Maes,
Constitutional Democracy, Constitutional Interpretation and Conflicting Rights, in CONFLICTS
BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 69, 84-85 (Eva Brems ed., 2008) (discussing Habermas’s
view on the co-original status of popular sovereignty and human rights). The idea that judicial
review violates the rights of the proponents of the challenged law has not taken serious root
in American law, although some theorists and judges have made nods in that direction at
times. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the Court’s invalidation of “the effort by the majority of citizens to preserve its view of sexual
morality statewide, against the efforts of a geographically concentrated and politically
powerful minority to undermine it”). And proponents of some laws challenged as discriminatory have raised the specific fundamental right of association to support the law. See, e.g.,
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34-35
(1959) (considering right of association as a neutral basis for deciding Brown). But courts have
never treated the right of association as presenting a case of conflicting rights with respect
to racial integration. The right of association was successfully raised, however, by an
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situations present cases of a constitutional right on one side and
restrictions on that right on the other without any credible corresponding constitutional value advanced by the law.41 In such cases,
there is little or no justification for deference to a legislature’s
denigration of the right, and judicial supremacy in interpreting that
right absolutely is the right way to go.42 Strict scrutiny evolved to
address just that situation.43
But legislatures also protect rights and legislate in pursuit of a
broad set of constitutional values such as democratic legitimacy and
equal status. Indeed, legislatures sometimes pave the way for
recognition of rights and values that courts later determine to be
embodied in a constitutional right.44 Lawrence Sager has urged a
justice-seeking account of judicial review that explicitly contemplates a partnership between judges and legislatures in seeking a
more just society.45 He envisions a divided constitutional labor between Congress and the courts in protecting rights.46 Other theorists
posit an obligation of legislatures “to engage in coherent, responsible
legislating with integrity” such that rights may be furthered even
if originating in legislative, rather than judicial, sources.47 Indeed,
on one account, legislatures may have an advantage in rights
protection because of their opportunity for public deliberation over
organization seeking to resist a statutory obligation not to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (holding that applying
state accommodations law to control Boy Scouts’ membership decision violated the group’s
First Amendment right of expressive association). Dale is an example of a case in which it
would have been fruitful for the Court to treat the matter as a conflict of rights rather than
as one right being alleged against a restriction on rights. See Ofer Raban, Conflicts of Rights:
When the Federal Constitution Restricts Civil Liberties, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 381, 395-96 (2012)
(discussing the Court’s “quick dismissal” of the State’s effort to advance its view of equality,
a value recognized in both State and Federal Constitutions).
41. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1270, 1275
(2007).
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (examining evidence of consensus among states in prohibiting juvenile death penalty); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
573 (2003) (examining emerging state trend toward decriminalizing same-sex conduct).
45. See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES 7 (2004) (recommending judicial
action “in service of the efforts of the nonjudicial actors to realize constitutional justice”).
46. See id. at 102.
47. James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking the
Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1377, 1385 (2005) (addressing
the “doctrine of political responsibility” put forward by Dworkin but never developed fully).
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moral and political principle, and in fact they now do better than
courts when it comes to protecting the constitutional value of
equality.48
Waldron warns that, although we are generally tempted to think
of courts as better able to make decisions about rights because of
their institutional characteristics, “there are also things about
courts that make it difficult for them to grapple directly with the
moral issues that rights-disagreements present.”49 The choice of
which institution is the preferable repository of rights depends
largely on important assumptions about the society making the
laws.50 If the legislature at issue is subject to malfunctions such as
sectarian or racial prejudice, then a judicial check on laws is needed
to remedy violations of rights that may have been undervalued by
the lawmaking body.51 But in a society with a robust culture of
representation, political equality, and open debate, Waldron urges
that legislatures are in at least as good a position as courts to
consider rights and, moreover, are freed of some of the obsessions
that he believes hinder courts from confronting the true moral
implications of their decisions.52 He contrasts, for example, the
“rich” reasoning in legislative debates on important issues of controversial rights such as abortion with the relatively thin engagement
with the moral issues at stake in the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Roe v. Wade.53
In my view, Waldron has not succeeded in establishing that
eliminating judicial review is a good move, or one necessary to the
fulfillment of self-determination of the people.54 But his arguments
do very strongly support a more modest position: even if legislatures
are not sufficiently trustworthy to justify replacing courts as the
48. See Stephen M. Griffin, Judicial Supremacy and Equal Protection in a Democracy of
Rights, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 281, 300, 312 (2002).
49. Waldron, supra note 22, at 1376.
50. See id. at 1386.
51. See id. at 1406.
52. Id. at 1383-84.
53. Id. at 1384-85.
54. I reject this ultimate conclusion in part for fear of the fragility of Waldron’s essential
assumptions, as well as for the reasons artfully put forward by Richard Fallon. See Fallon,
supra note 24, at 1699 (arguing that, even if Waldron is right that courts may be no more
likely to decide rights correctly, judicial review is still preferable to minimize errors of
underprotection of rights).
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arbiters of rights, at the very least they should be taken seriously
when they demonstrate an intention to act as expositors of different
understandings of rights. When legislatures pass laws out of a
conception of what constitutional values such as equality or liberty
require, those laws should come to a court with at least even odds
on their constitutionality—not a presumption against constitutionality. Even one who believes in judicial supremacy because of its
importance in upholding rights should acknowledge that there is no
reason to think the courts have a monopoly on the demands of
justice in a democracy.
My claim is that the Supreme Court has erred in reflexively
applying strict scrutiny to conflicting rights claims, and in failing to
examine such cases as an opportunity to mitigate the concerns
associated with judicial supremacy and enhance the legitimacy of
judicial review. In such cases, the legislature has made a determination that a constitutional value is in need of protection and has
acted, not to oppress, but to further that value as the proponents of
the legislation understand it.55 This understanding does not, of
course, offer the legislature a free pass to violate the Constitution.
But when there are reasonable grounds for the Waldronian citizenry
to maintain a good-faith difference of opinion about, on the one
hand, the scope or conception of the constitutional right being
invoked in opposition to the law and, on the other hand, the rightsenhancing goals of the law,56 the Court should take seriously the
views of the elected branch and apply a more deferential standard.
Make no mistake, what I am suggesting is still an exercise in
judicial supremacy. It is the Court that will ultimately decide the
constitutional question whether the legislature’s justifications are
sufficient to defeat the conflicting claim of right. And there will no
doubt be times when the Court would take the legislature’s cause
seriously but still rule that it has encroached on protected constitutional rights as conceived by the Court. However, this kind of case
is an opportunity for the Court to build into its doctrine a mitigating
55. Some examples might include laws passed to limit hate speech or bullying; to limit
campaign expenditures; or to restrict sexual harassment in the workplace, all subject to
challenge under the First Amendment.
56. See Waldron, supra note 22, at 1406 (summarizing his theory of rights-based disagreements judicial review in “reasonably democratic societies” where citizens “disagree about
rights”).
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approach that respects the people’s reasonable disagreements about
rights.
II. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND ITS SERVANT, STRICT SCRUTINY
There are a few doctrines that the Supreme Court has developed
that explicitly call for deference to other branches in recognition of
what the Court sees as appropriate limits on judicial reach. The
political question doctrine is the most obvious of these, under which
the Court decides whether a matter is committed by the Constitution to another branch or to the judiciary and proceeds to resolve the
case accordingly.57 If the Court decides the Constitution relegates a
question to another branch, it will dismiss the challenges.58 If the
Court instead reads the Constitution to place a limit on the other
branch’s exercise of discretion, then it will view the challenge as
presenting a legal question and decide whether the other branch
acted within its designated authority.59 As Tara Grove has documented, this itself is an exercise in judicial supremacy,60 but it is
one in which the Court is using its privilege of having final say on
the Constitution’s meaning in a way that may recognize a sphere of
discretion in another branch.61
There are also less explicit doctrinal frameworks that build in a
tacit acknowledgment of the institutional limitations on the courts,
such as rational-basis review, which accords a degree of leeway to
legislatures to implement reasonable policies without bearing a
heavy burden of justification to the judiciary.62 Again, this does not
57. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962) (setting forth the modern political
question doctrine).
58. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1908, 1909 (2015).
59. See id. at 1964.
60. See id. at 1963-67 (discussing the Court’s use of the political question doctrine as a
reflection of its belief in judicial supremacy).
61. Examples are rare; most recently the Court declined to review the Senate’s procedures
for impeaching a judge because it saw that process as relegated to the Senate’s discretion by
the text of Article I. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1993). But the Court
made clear in United States v. Nixon that the question of who decides justiciability—the Court
or some other government actor—is itself always a question for the Court. 418 U.S. 683, 703
(1974).
62. Rational-basis review—with its presumptions favoring constitutionality—is “a paradigm of judicial restraint.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993).
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mean abdication of judicial review or diminution of judicial supremacy, but it is a tool used by the Court to achieve what it views as the
correct allocation of decisional responsibility within the constitutional structure that we have.63
The Court also has employed strict judicial scrutiny on legislative
acts in circumstances where there was little likelihood that the
legislature had acted for reasons other than to oppress, exclude,
denigrate, or otherwise subordinate politically powerless people.64
This utterly nondeferential approach, developed by the Warren
Court, was generally applauded as affording the appropriate protection to rights under circumstances in which deference did not
appear justified, at the same time that it put the judiciary in the
position of greatest strength and control with respect to legislatures
passing the laws.65 Certainly, the intuition is that if there is any
place for judicial supremacy, slapping down intransigent and
malicious legislatures is it.66 The great strength of strict judicial
scrutiny is its ability to smoke out invidious motivations by exposing
pretextual state justifications for oppressive measures.67 If the State
has chosen to impose a burden on a vulnerable group or on the
exercise of an important right, and cannot show why it was compelled by the public interest to do so, then the inference arises that the
state was actually seeking to burden rights, which is not allowed.68
That model is less compelling, however, when either the rights in
question are less clear or the objectives of the legislature are not as
obviously invidious.69 It is the confluence of those two factors that
63. Cf. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 385 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“To apply [rational-basis review,] a rule designed to restrict courts[,] as if it
restricted Congress’s legislative power is to stand the underlying principle—a principle of
judicial restraint—on its head.”).
64. See ELY, supra note 39, at 146 (arguing that strict scrutiny allows courts to throw out
legislation designed with nefarious purposes).
65. See id. at 148.
66. See Jed Rubenfeld, Essay, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 436 (1997).
67. See id.
68. See ELY , supra note 39, at 146 (explaining that where actual state goals are
impermissible, the law will have to be defended by other goals to which it relates more
tenuously, which will be difficult to do).
69. See Rubenfeld, supra note 66, at 436-37. As Rubenfeld explains, strict scrutiny “makes
good sense when a law singles out a particular class of persons for adverse treatment and
there is reason to fear that the law seeks to achieve an impermissible purpose relating to this
group.” Id. at 436. But it does not make sense when the legislature’s invidious purpose is
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is the focus of this Article. That is, when the Court must determine
whether an individual right is violated by a law that is itself an
effort to advance or protect constitutional rights and values legislatively, how does a belief in judicial supremacy inform a decision
on how the Court should respond?
This kind of accommodation to other branches has received
insufficient consideration in the cases involving claims of conflicting
rights. When the legislature acts to protect the interests of groups
not enjoying majority status in the polity, the first thing to notice is
that the paradigmatic indicia of legislative malfunction, in the
Elysian sense, is missing.70 John Hart Ely established the legitimacy of judicial intervention without deference in situations in
which the “ins” are burdening the “outs” or are blocking the
channels of political change.71 The risk of illegitimate self-dealing,
entrenchment, and externalization of burdens to out-groups justified
the so-called “representation reinforcing” strict scrutiny of courts.72
But in the opposite situation, when legislatures seek to benefit the
vulnerable, as Waldron posits, the same suspect motivations are not
apparent and a different justification for judicial intervention is
called for.73
The Supreme Court, for the most part, has not been amenable to
addressing these situations as a conflict of two sets of rights
claims.74 Rather, the Court appears captured by its own formalities—developed in eras of different needs—which dictate that if a
fundamental right is claimed, strict scrutiny (and its lack of serious
engagement with state interests) is the only option.
A good example of the Court’s adherence to formality is the
holding in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, holding that the imposition of
federal limits on contributions to a political candidate violates the
uncontested.
70. See ELY, supra note 39, at 101-03, 135-36.
71. See id. at 101-03.
72. See id.
73. The same reasoning, tying the Court’s power to resolve the constitutional conflict to
its obligation to protect rights, would call for deference in cases in which rights-protecting
statutes were challenged on structural—rather than rights—grounds, such as challenges to
Congress’s power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See
Fallon, supra note 24, at 1700-01.
74. See Raban, supra note 40, at 407 (suggesting rights conflicts have been “swe[pt] ...
under the rug”).
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First Amendment.75 The complex opinion, much simplified here,
presented, among other issues, a constitutional challenge to limits
on campaign expenditures, which Congress sought to justify on the
ground that it was acting to “equalize the relative ability of all
citizens to affect the outcome of elections.”76 Thus, Congress was
seeking to protect the constitutional values of electoral integrity and
political equality by limiting the amount of money that could be
spent.77 In opposition, the plaintiffs claimed an infringement of the
First Amendment right to free speech.78 Rather than confront the
specific facts of the case at hand—that is, the centrality of expenditures to the core constitutional right of free speech; the law’s design
to place dollar limits on expenditures, but not to prohibit expression
altogether or to target any particular point of view or idea; and the
legislature’s substantial compilation of evidence supporting the need
for restrictions to support the goal of political equality—the Buckley
Court rejected all calls to apply a lower level of scrutiny.79 The
analysis did not engage in any kind of effort to reconcile two
competing constitutional claims: one by plaintiffs and one by the
legislature on behalf of a larger class of public interests.80
Indeed, the Buckley Court dismissed any such reconciliation in
one sentence: “[T]he concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”81
To have taken more seriously the possibility of reconciling the two
constitutional values would have been an exercise in mitigating
judicial supremacy. But, even though the case involved a topic area
generally delegated to the Congress by the Elections Clause,82 the
Court appeared to see its role primarily as a defender of the
individual claimant before it; seemingly, the Court saw no obligation
to privilege in any way the wide notions of political equality or
75. 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam).
76. Id. at 26.
77. See id. at 25-26.
78. See id. at 24.
79. See id. at 18-19 (declining to view the limit as one on conduct or as a time, place, and
manner restriction because it affected the amount of paid advertising a person could buy).
80. See id. at 48-49.
81. Id.
82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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electoral integrity purportedly advanced by the law.83 The doctrinal
response of applying an “exacting” scrutiny inexorably followed.84
As an illustration of another approach to the same question, the
lower court opinion in Buckley devoted nearly twenty pages in the
Federal Reporter to the historic and critical need for a public
response to a crisis in the integrity of the electoral system, quoting
great figures from Abraham Lincoln to Franklin Roosevelt and
finding much to say on the constitutional values at stake in the
enactment of the federal law.85 “What nourishes and invigorates
democracy is the root of widespread popular participation,” the D.C.
Circuit sweepingly declared.86 Because of what it saw as strong
constitutional claims on the side of the statute, the D.C. Circuit,
while agreeing that the standard should be exacting in evaluating
the plaintiff’s constitutional challenges, found that standard met.87
It viewed the case as one of conflicting constitutional values: it
found that the Act, while limiting some First Amendment rights,
also “enhance[d] First Amendment values ... [b]y reducing in good
measure disparity due to wealth.”88
Consider, as another example, the argument that has been leveled in some law reviews to the effect that Title VII, the federal law
prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace, violates the First
Amendment because the offending conduct could take the form of
harassing words or images.89 Thus, the argument goes, strict scrutiny should apply and it is unclear that Congress’s goal of fostering
equality in the workplace would be sufficient to allow the provision
to survive. Although the Court has yet to address this claim, the
argument is well within the bounds of the doctrinal precedent,90 and
83. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45.
84. See id.
85. See Buckley, 519 F.2d 821, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (per curiam), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
86. Id.
87. See id. at 843-44.
88. Id. at 841.
89. See Kingsley R. Browne, Zero Tolerance for the First Amendment: Title VII’s
Regulation of Employee Speech, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 563, 578-79 (2001) (arguing
constitutional vulnerability of sexual harassment laws).
90. See DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir.
1995) (“[W]hen Title VII is applied to sexual harassment claims founded solely on verbal insults, pictorial or literary matter, the statute imposes content-based, viewpoint-discriminatory
restrictions on speech.”).
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some Justices have acknowledged its force.91 This example illustrates the conflicting rights problem well. Once a reviewing court
frames the issue posed by Title VII as an individual constitutional
right pitted against infringing legislation, it will have already gone
too far toward dismissing and undervaluing the valid rights claims
of the legislature.92 Instead, the courts should assess the situation
more holistically by looking, first, to the degree and nature of the
statute’s interference with the right of speech and, second, to
whether a legislature could reasonably hold an understanding of
equality that is important enough to trade off this kind of limit on
speech. If so, the courts should be out of strict scrutiny territory,
which rests on an assumption of bad faith.93 It is not my aim here to
suggest an alternative doctrinal framework; my goal is to argue that
the rights-protecting justification that gives courts their legitimacy
is best served if courts engage with the actual conflict of rights and
make a judgment based on having taken both seriously, without the
distorting effects of strict scrutiny.
Whether intended or not, indiscriminately applying strict scrutiny
enables the courts to give selective priority to some rights over
others, without ever having to defend that choice. The nature of
certain more individually salient rights (as well as rules of standing
and justiciability) makes it more likely that beneficiaries of a rightsproviding statute will not be able to claim the structural benefits of
strict scrutiny, while individual objectors to the expansion of civil
rights will. Courts should be alert to the unexamined consequences
of this asymmetry.
Compare the difference in the treatment of laws prohibiting
affirmative action in contrast to those permitting it. Most would say
that the controversy about use of race for purposes of inclusion and
increasing opportunity is a good example of the way that people can
91. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 409-10 (1992) (White, J., concurring) (discussing hostile work environment claims under the majority opinion’s analysis of the First
Amendment).
92. Possibly this is not a good example because the actual sexual harassment policy was
a creature of regulation rather than statute and that could affect the robustness of my
critique. But for purposes of illustration, I will assume that the sexual harassment prohibition
has been endorsed by Congress.
93. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny and assuming bad faith in cases of racial classifications).
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reasonably and in good faith think differently about what the right
to equality requires. The Court itself has been closely divided on
how to apply the concept of equality to the conception of affirmative
action.94 Yet the judicial treatment of the two points of view has not
been symmetrical because the Supreme Court does not accept the
idea that conflicting understandings of rights should be confronted
squarely as such.95 In Schuette v. BAMN, for example, the Court
considered a challenge to the constitutionality of a state constitutional amendment prohibiting the preferential use of race in any of
the state’s operations.96 Objectors had leveled a political process
objection to that provision, arguing that the constitutional ban on
any kind of racial preference imposed a special burden on racial
minorities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.97 The Court
upheld the provision without applying any scrutiny at all because
a majority of the Justices did not consider the plaintiffs to have
presented an injury on account of race.98 What was remarkable was
the plurality’s additional observation that if the Court were to
intrude on the decision of the people to resolve this sensitive matter
for themselves after full debate, “that holding would be an unprecedented restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right held not
just by one person but by all in common.”99 This comment recognizing a fundamental right in the people to resolve matters of public
policy for themselves would seem to call into question the use of
strict scrutiny any time there is a reasonable disagreement about
rights, suggesting that policies enacted through popular legislative
processes enjoy a presumption of legitimacy as the fruits of a right

94. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (plurality opinion).
In Bakke, the Justices struggled to reach a consensus, issuing a fractured plurality opinion.
See id. at 267-68.
95. Indeed, a bare majority of the Court has insisted that there can be no good-faith
disagreement. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 229-30 (reasoning that whenever
the government treats people unequally because of race the injury is the same regardless of
motivation).
96. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights &
Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014) (plurality
opinion).
97. See id. at 1651-53 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 1635-36 (plurality opinion).
99. Id. at 1637.

2017]

TAKING CONFLICTING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

1453

of people to resolve difficult social conflicts through law.100 Yet that
is not at all the way the courts usually see the problem.
When Congress or state entities have gone the other way and
opted to use racial considerations remedially, the courts have responded with strict scrutiny.101 Strict scrutiny, of course, affords a
presumption of invalidity against the outcomes of popular debate on
the very topic that the Court found in Schuette to be an effort
toward “a constitutional order in which all persons are treated with
fairness and equal dignity.”102 In Adarand Constructors, it was the
Congress that had determined that federal contracts should be
awarded in a way that benefited those historically disadvantaged.103
Yet the Court gave no similar deference to a process of public policymaking that had viewed the dictates of fairness and equal dignity
as supporting a race-conscious program. Rather, it employed a
framework designed to protect individuals from legislative oppression. While that important task justifies judicial supremacy, a
reasonable disagreement about what fairness and equality demand
does not. By employing strict scrutiny in that circumstance, the
Supreme Court has exacerbated the costs of judicial supremacy by
supplanting an area of reasonable disagreement with its own view
of the merits.
III. UNDERSTANDING ALTERNATIVES
Asking courts to take seriously the rights claims of legislatures
acting in good faith on behalf of a public good is asking a lot.
Without the architecture of strict scrutiny to frame the inquiry,
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (insisting on
the use of strict scrutiny to analyze a minority-preference program because it imposed a
distinction based on race).
102. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1637. True, the gentle way the Court has sometimes applied
strict scrutiny has reflected the Court’s squeamishness about its presumptions of malice in
some situations, as in Grutter v. Bollinger, where the Court explicitly gave “a degree of
deference” to state university administrators in determining whether the interest they
asserted was compelling enough to meet strict scrutiny. 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). Strict
scrutiny is not a place for deference, and, conversely, situations calling for deference should
not be distorted by the use of strict scrutiny. Fusing the two not only undermines the
theoretical integrity of the doctrinal framework, but also does damage to the utility of strict
scrutiny when it is indeed needed to smoke out invidious or malicious legislation.
103. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 208.
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there is no mechanical analysis to ease the discomfort of confronting
conflicts directly.104 No doubt this should raise concerns that important rights could be eroded. But there is ground for judgment in
the reconciliation of conflicting rights that lies between the two
extremes of the rights-as-trumps model, which may reflexively value
rights too much, and the balancing away of rights, which values
them too little. John Rawls, for example, called for the mutual
adjustment of conflicting rights—which entails recognition of various factors such as the degree to which rights are being regulated
rather than restricted—and protection of the central imperative
underlying the rights.105 He recognized that refinement of the scope
of basic liberties was the foundation for a well-ordered society
operating on the basis of consensus.106 If the Supreme Court had
considered these Rawls factors in Buckley, for example, it would
have achieved a more deferential review of the federal election
laws.107 The Rawls approach, designed to recognize pluralism in a
society, also has relevance to the concerns about the rise of judicial
supremacy with its concomitant distancing from popular influences
on the meaning of the Constitution.108 A frank engagement with
constitutional dilemmas, for all its complexities, is preferable to an
ill-disguised resort to formulaic solutions that give cover to unprincipled and unacknowledged judicial preferences.
How to resolve conflicting claims of rights is a difficult matter,
to say the least. The question has plagued philosophers.109 But for
the courts, in cases of conflicting conceptions of the scope of particular rights such as those presented in the cases I have discussed,
the question does not arise in the abstract, as if a disembodied
104. See, e.g., id. at 226-27 (discussing the necessity of strict scrutiny in reviewing cases
of racial classification).
105. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 331-33, 336 (1993) (discussing how a fully
adequate scheme of liberties for a well-ordered society requires adjustment of basic liberties
to allow essential conditions); Lorenzo Zucca, Conflicts of Fundamental Rights as
Constitutional Dilemmas, in CONFLICTS BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 40, at
19, 33. Consideration of specifics, such as those involved in adjustment, was not part of the
analysis in Buckley. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
106. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 250 (1971) (noting that “a less extensive
liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all”).
107. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
108. See RAWLS, supra note 105, at 331-32.
109. See DWORKIN , supra note 40, at 74.
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fundamental right to liberty may be thought to be tragically
compromised by another fundamental right to equality, for example.
When a rights-enhancing statute is challenged for an alleged
constitutional violation, one way or another, the courts must either
strike down the law because it violates an individual’s right, or
uphold the law in derogation of the claim of a rights violation.110
Either way, one view of rights gives way to another. But it is done
in the context of a specific set of facts, circumstances, and values,
which should give the courts insight into how to resolve the competing claims. When the courts delve right in with strict scrutiny,
by contrast, it stacks the deck against the legislature and the
understandings of the public good that the legislature’s law reflects.
Ronald Dworkin has done the most convincing job, in my view,
of addressing the question of how to judge specific conflicting claims
to rights. He understands liberty as “freedom to do whatever you
like so long as you respect the moral rights, properly understood, of
others.”111 Notice that, in contrast to the competing definition of
liberty as “freedom from the interference of others in doing whatever it is that you might wish to do,”112 Dworkin’s definition builds
in additional judgments about when limitations may be justified
by other factors.113 Just as, for example, we understand liberty to
stop short of entitling us to inflict harm on others, we might
understand other rights, such as free speech, to stop short of
entitling a speaker to inflict certain kinds of harm.114 Dworkin
provides a basis to resist the idea that a conflict in values inevitably
“involves some genuine and important damage,” because in the end
reconciliation comes from addressing and refining the social values
implicit in restrictions of liberty, which affect what we understand
110. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003).
111. Ronald Dworkin, Do Liberal Values Conflict?, in THE LEGACY OF ISAIAH BERLIN 73, 84
(Mark Lilla et al. eds., 2001).
112. Id. (referring to Berlin’s view of liberty).
113. See id.
114. See Rebecca L. Brown, The Harm Principle and Free Speech, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 953,
954 (2016) (exploring the implications of this understanding of free speech). To be clear, this
particular example is not an application that Dworkin would embrace. See, e.g., Ronald
Dworkin, Even Bigots and Holocaust Deniers Must Have Their Say, GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2006,
9:02 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/14/muhammadcartoons.comment
[https://perma.cc/23F3-8UM2] (arguing that free speech should not be adjusted to accommodate a conflicting right not to be insulted or offended).
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liberty to be.115 Thus, although all would profess a shared belief in
the importance of liberty, equality, and democracy, Dworkin calls for
“an account that shows us what is good about liberty or equality or
democracy, so that we can see why any compromise of these values
is not merely inconvenient but bad.”116 He does not accept that all
compromises of basic rights are wrong; rather, it must be shown
whether alleged violations of liberty “are really breaches of some
special responsibility for which a state should feel remorse.”117 This
inquiry necessarily calls for an assessment of state objectives and
context, beyond a formalistic conclusion that a liberty has been
compromised. It is ironic to invoke Dworkin’s argument in defense
of a call to weaken the scrutiny given to laws challenged for
constitutional rights violation. But his view of rights—as conceptions whose bounds are shaped by societal commitments—provides
at least nascent support for acknowledging the possibility of
reasonable disagreement about what rights entail in particular
circumstances and what incursions are justified by those circumstances.118
This background provides the beginning of a judicial approach to
conflicts among constitutional rights. Factual circumstances of
cases, an examination of exactly the degree and nature of the
infringement, and the concrete interests served by a law can all help
courts to hone their understanding of the right at stake in light of
societal demands and make a reasoned judgment about whether the
right has been infringed.119 Strict scrutiny is at odds with that
careful engagement with specifics.
The Court has tried something like this once. In Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court
struggled to take account of a possible reasonable disagreement
about what rights entail when it retreated from its fundamental
rights approach to abortion.120 In that case, a plurality of the Court
115. Dworkin, supra note 111, at 79-80.
116. Id. at 87.
117. Id. at 88.
118. See id. at 87-88.
119. See Raban, supra note 40, at 405. Raban’s article offers a nice demonstration of how
“[e]ven when genuine conflicts among constitutional rights actually arise, rational deliberation has much to say on their proper resolution.” Id.
120. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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abandoned the doctrinal posture of suspicion called for by Roe v.
Wade for the acknowledged purpose of giving greater credit to state
interests in protecting the life of a fetus.121 The fundamental rights
approach—requiring a state to supply a compelling interest for its
restrictions on the right—was not compatible with a true belief in
the legitimacy of the values that the state restrictions on abortion
were seeking to further under Casey.122 Significantly, in coming to
this view, the plurality did not accept the framework of strict
scrutiny, but still tinkered with the rigor of its demands in order to
relax the burden on the state.123 In fact, the opinion declined to
apply strict scrutiny at all.124 I take that choice as a recognition that
the entire edifice of strict scrutiny as a basis for judicial inquiry is
incompatible with any serious valuation of state interests and
motivations.125 Once the Justices had made the decision to respect
the differences that exist on the question of the proper scope of a
woman’s liberty in this regard, they saw rejection of strict scrutiny
as a necessary way to give meaning to that belief system.126 The
undue burden test leaves a great deal to be desired, and I am not
here to sing its praises as it has been understood so far in the cases.
My point, though, is that even the Casey opinion recognizes that
strict scrutiny is incompatible with the courts giving the kind of
serious regard to good-faith disagreements about rights that Jeremy
Waldron’s powerful argument demands.127 Casey stands as a rare
example of a forthright acceptance of the Court’s obligation to
accommodate competing claims of rights.128
121. See id. at 876 (plurality opinion) (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
122. Id. at 950-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in part).
123. Id. at 871, 876 (plurality opinion).
124. See id. at 876 (“In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of
reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”).
125. See id. at 873 (reasoning that the Roe framework as applied “undervalues the State’s
interest in potential life”).
126. See id. at 871, 876.
127. See supra Part I.
128. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357-59 (1978) (Brennan,
White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part)
(arguing that because no fundamental right and no suspect class was involved, and race was
not irrelevant to the State’s legitimate objectives, remedial racial programs should be
subjected to an intermediate standard of review); JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN ,
ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 62-68 (2013) (discussing Casey as
an effort to achieve balance between liberty and responsibility).
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If the courts were to adopt this kind of approach as a norm, it
would go a long way toward mitigating the concerns about judicial
supremacy as a threat to democracy.129 Among these concerns is the
loss of moral accountability outside the courts, which can be a
consequence of courts claiming for themselves the role as arbiters
of moral truth.130 Opponents of judicial review have long warned of
the deadening of the people’s sense of moral responsibility when
judicial review reserves all important choices of principle for the
courts alone.131 The courts can still provide rigorous protection of
rights when circumstances call for it, while forging a partnership
with the people by respecting their efforts to make society more just
through the representative process of lawmaking.
CONCLUSION
Judicial supremacy is tolerated in a democracy because the
Supreme Court stands as a “forum of principle” to ensure that the
conditions of democracy are met.132 As a forum of principle, the
judiciary must be sensitive to its obligation to respect the selfdetermination of the people and to ensure that when elected
legislatures act to enhance justice for the people, those legislatures
act in concert with courts and not at their mercy. Strict scrutiny has
no place in the review of laws passed in good faith by people acting
out of different beliefs about what justice requires. Those laws
deserve to be assessed with respect afforded to all of the constitutional values implicated in the case at hand. Anything less silences
the call to take conflicting rights seriously. Anything less does an
injustice to judicial supremacy itself.

129. See generally BICKEL, supra note 14, at 21-23 (discussing how judicial review weakens
the democratic process and contradicts democratic theory).
130. See id. at 21-22.
131. See id. (discussing JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 103-04, 106-07 (1901)).
132. See RONALD DWORKIN , A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 71 (1985) (contrasting judicial focus
on questions of justice from the legislature’s “battleground of power politics”).

